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Turkey’s economy: a story of success with an uncertain future
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz
In the decade since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey’s econo-
my has become synonymous with success and well-implemented reforms. Economic devel- 
opment has been the basis of both socio-political stability inside the country and of an am-
bitious foreign policy agenda pursued by the AKP. However, the risks associated with a series 
of unresolved issues are becoming increasingly apparent. These include the country’s current 
account deficit, its over-reliance on short-term external financing, and unfinished reforms, for 
example of the education sector.
This leaves Turkey exposed to over-dependence on investors, especially from the West. Conse- 
quently, Ankara has become a hostage of its own image as an economically successful state with 
a stable socio-political system. Any changes to this image would cause capital flight, as exempli-
fied by the outflow of portfolio investment1 and an increase in the cost of external debt2 that fol-
lowed the nationwide protests over the proposed closure of Gezi Park last summer. In addition, 
Turkey remains vulnerable to potential changes in investor sentiment towards emerging markets.
Turkey’s economic success and its roots1 2
The past decade has been a time of econom-
ic boom for Turkey. Between 2002 and 2007, 
the country’s economy grew at an annual rate 
of 7.2%. Turkey also performed relatively well 
throughout the global financial crisis: after 
a slowdown in GDP growth to just 0.6% in 2008 
and a subsequent recession (which saw a 4.6% 
contraction in GDP), the economy strongly re-
bounded, producing 8.8% growth in 2010 and 
1 According to Central Bank figures, in June (during the 
protests) the outflow of portfolio investments reached 
$3.2 billion. In August, the investments began to return 
(showing an increase of $1.8 billion) but at a slower rate 
than in the same month a year earlier (when portfolio 
investments increased by $2.2 billion).
2 The average interest rate on Turkish bonds rose from 
a record low of 5.15% in May to 6.98% in June and peak-
ed at 9.3% in August. In September, the interest rate 
dropped to 8.8% (source: CEIC).
9.2% in 2011. The economic success was partly 
the result of a series of reforms initiated by Econ-
omy Minister Kemal Derviş in the aftermath the 
1999-2001 economic crisis, and partly thanks to 
the 2000-2001 IMF stabilisation programmes. 
These reforms were continued by the AKP after 
the party secured a parliamentary majority in 
the 2002 elections, which stabilised the coun-
try’s political scene and created the right con-
ditions for implementing reforms. The AKP gov-
ernment began the privatisation of loss-making 
state-owned enterprises, which resulted in an 
unprecedented inflow of foreign direct invest-
ment3. It also carried out a successful reform of 
the banking system, which protected it against 
the fallout from the global financial crisis. In ad-
3 Between 2002 and 2012, the cumulative inflow of FDI to 
Turkey reached $123.8 billion. This compared favourably 
to 1991-2001 when Turkey attracted just $11.3 billion in 
FDI (source: Central Bank of Turkey).
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dition, Turkey adopted a floating exchange rate 
system, lifted restrictions on foreign capital in-
flows, tightened fiscal discipline, increased the 
independence of the Central Bank, and stabi-
lised inflation.
The Turkish economy also benefited from ob-
jective conditions: its geographical location, 
namely, its proximity to EU markets, as well as 
from a growing population, whose economic 
potential has not yet been fully exploited (be-
tween 2001 and 2012, Turkey’s population in-
creased by 10 million people, reaching 75 mil-
lion). Turkey has also capitalised on the upward 
economic trend in other parts of the world and 
on the launch of accession talks with the EU, 
which have been a catalyst for further reforms 
and have had a positive influence on the per-
ception of the country among foreign investors.
One effect of the reforms has been the emer-
gence of a new class of entrepreneurs in central 
Anatolia, creating an alternative to the indus-
trial class traditionally based in and around Is-
tanbul. The owners of small and medium-sized 
companies in Central Turkey (Ankara, Kayseri, 
Gaziantep), who support the AKP, have become 
the main engine of Turkey’s export expansion 
into the Middle East and North Africa. Over 
time, the so-called Anatolian tigers amassed 
sufficient capital to begin competing with Is-
tanbul-based holdings4 and created an alterna-
tive economic elite in the country.
4 Between 1997-2007, the number of companies from 
Konya, Kayseri and Ankara listed among the country’s 
500 largest enterprises by the Istanbul Chamber of In-
dustry increased by 40. Meanwhile, the number of Istan-
bul-based companies on the list dropped by 108.
Turkey’s GDP growth, and perhaps even more 
importantly, a rise in the purchasing power of 
the population5, coupled with the widespread 
belief among the general public that the coun-
try’s economy continues to improve, have all 
contributed to the AKP’s popularity and have 
formed the basis of an ambitious foreign policy 
pursued by Ankara. Turkey’s political and eco-
nomic model has been well received by both 
the European Union and by countries across the 
Middle East, and was to be exploited as a po-
tential export product. Turkey’s economic suc-
cess has also given rise to Ankara’s ambition to 
play a leading role in the Middle East and to be 
perceived as an equal partner by the EU.
The weaknesses of Turkey’s economy
Although at the macroeconomic level, Turkey 
has successfully carried out a series of effective 
reforms that have helped stabilise its econom-
ic system, the lack of a comprehensive reform 
of the state has prevented it from joining the 
ranks of developed countries. Among the fail-
ings of the AKP has been the lack of education 
reform - it was not until 2012 that the period 
of compulsory school education was extended 
from 8 to 12 years, but even then no measures 
were taken to improve the quality of education-
al provision. At the same time, the government 
decided to put Islamic education on a par with 
secular education, which has given rise to alle-
gations of the Islamisation of Turkish society6. 
The failure to reform the education system has 
also had a negative effect on the qualifications 
of the country’s workforce. Similarly, the govern-
ment has also failed to overhaul Turkey’s labour 
market, which is one of the reasons for its low 
levels of inclusiveness: in 2011, the labour force 
5 GDP per capita at purchasing power parity increased 
from Intl $8,800 in 2002 to Intl $14,000 in 2007 and 
reached more than Intl $18,000 in 2012.
6 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/30/uk-turkey-edu-
cation-idUKBRE82T12D20120330
Turkey’s economic success has also given 
rise to Ankara’s ambition to play a leading 
role in the Middle East and to be perceived 
as an equal partner by the EU.
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participation rate for the population was just 
50%, and only 28% for women. Moreover, due 
to increasing demographic pressures, the rate of 
job creation is lower than the rate at which new 
generations of workers enter the labour market. 
Meanwhile, the minimum wage remains rela-
tively high and has not been adjusted to reflect 
significant differences in the cost of living be-
tween different parts of the country (in July of 
this year, the minimum wage was set at around 
€400). The tax system remains inefficient and 
the added value of exports is still low, although 
there has been some improvement in the struc-
ture of Turkish exports (between 2001-2010, the 
share of medium-technology products in total 
exports increased from 25% to 40%; source: TE-
PAV). In addition, the Turkish economy contin-
ues to suffer as a result of the country’s corrupt 
and politicised judicial system (although reform 
of this was launched last year) and because of 
strong links between business and politics.
This means that Turkey’s transformation is still 
in progress and further reforms are needed to 
bring about the necessary structural changes 
in its economy. The outcomes envisaged in-
clude: an increase in the quality and volume of 
Turkish exports, stimulating economic growth 
through exports rather than through domestic 
consumption7, improving the skills of the work-
force, raising the number of economically active 
people as well as increasing the productivity 
and competitiveness of the Turkish economy8.
7 In 2012, final consumption expenditure accounted for 
84.4% of Turkey’s GDP; exports of goods and services - 
26.4%; gross capital formation - 20.28% (source: World 
Bank). By comparison, in 2001 these figures stood at 
80.8%, 27% and 15%, respectively. This suggests that 
over the past decade the structure of the Turkish econo-
my has not changed considerably.
8 In the 2013-2014 Global Competitiveness Index report 
Turkey ranked 44th (down by one place compared to 
2012-2013). The factors adversely affecting the compet-
itiveness of the Turkish economy identified in the report 
are: high taxes, inadequately skilled workforce, red tape 
and bureaucracy, as well as regulations on foreign cur-
rency exchange and tax regulations.
Turkey’s perilous deficit
The biggest risk to the Turkish economy is posed 
by the growing structural deficit in the coun-
try’s current account9 and by its over-reliance 
on so-called hot money in financing the econo-
my, which leaves it more vulnerable to how the 
country is perceived by foreign investors. The 
state of the economy is also contingent on do-
mestic political stability and on the dynamic of 
geopolitical events taking place in the region, 
in particular, the conflict in Syria. There is also 
the added danger that investors might become 
reluctant to invest in emerging markets - Wash-
ington’s decision to adopt a stricter monetary 
policy could prompts investors to abandon risk-
ier markets, including Turkey10. 
Turkey’s current account deficit is caused by, 
among other things, a high level of imports, 
resulting mainly from the country’s reliance on 
imported energy carriers (in 2012, the cost of 
energy imports reached 25% of the total value 
of imports), as well as by a high proportion of 
imported intermediates used in the production 
9 In 2012, Turkey was able to cut its current account deficit 
from $77.2 billion to $48.9 billion. This was the result of 
its economic cooling policies (GDP grew by just 2.2% in 
2012), which reduced lending and thus also domestic con-
sumption. The reduction of the deficit was also aided by an 
unprecedented increase in exports to Iran. Ankara posted 
as ‘exports’ the gold it sent to Iran in payment for Iranian 
gas (in 2012, the value of Turkish exports to Iran reached 
$9.9 billion, compared to $3.6 billion in 2011).
10 http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?Re-
searchID=2474
Risk to the Turkish economy is posed by 
the growing structural deficit in the coun-
try’s current account  and by its over-reli-
ance on so-called hot money in financing 
the economy, which leaves it more vul-
nerable to how the country is perceived 
by foreign investors.
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of Turkish export goods11 - which means that 
export growth entails an increase in imports. 
The deficit is also a consequence of Turkey’s 
high domestic consumption (growth in indus-
trial production increases imports), which is fu-
elled by easily available consumer credit. How-
ever, due to a low level of deposits, local banks 
are forced to raise capital abroad.
Cuts in energy prices
The government is aware of these risks. Given 
that over the next decade Turkey’s energy de-
mand is forecast to double, Ankara has been 
striving to bring down the cost of future ener-
gy imports as well as to develop its domestic 
energy resources (in 2011, 72% of the energy 
consumed by Turkey came from abroad). The 
elements of the government’s energy strategy 
include: a decision to build two nuclear pow-
er plants (the first of them is due to be com-
pleted in 2023); liberalisation of the electricity 
and gas market; development of Turkey’s gas 
infrastructure in order to enable greater diver-
sification of gas supplies and the establishment 
of a gas market in the country; prospecting for 
domestic energy resources (e.g. shale gas de-
posits); development of power plants fired by 
11 According to IMF studies, the share of imported inter-
mediates in export products reached 70% before the 
2008-2009 economic crisis. In 2012, the share of import-
ed intermediates was estimated at 48% and the share 
of capital goods at 14%. The decrease was a result of 
a higher proportion of low-processed goods (food, con-
struction materials) in exports. Cf. http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12339.pdf
locally produced brown coal12. The need to pro-
vide affordable energy for Turkey, coupled with 
a broad range of security issues, has been one 
of the reasons for Ankara’s cooperation with 
Iraqi Kurdistan. In October of this year, Turkey 
began the construction of a gas pipeline to 
Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, in the hope of import-
ing 10 bcm of gas a year, at prices significantly 
lower than those charged by Turkey’s current 
main gas suppliers: Russia and Iran. The govern-
ment’s energy strategy also envisages greater 
energy efficiency and the modernisation of ex-
isting power plants. However, given the long-
term nature of these measures, they are unlike-
ly to reduce Turkey’s dependence on foreign 
capital in the immediate future. This, in turn, 
means that for the time being Turkey remains 
exposed to the risks associated with a potential 
increase in energy prices.
Foreign trade
The growth of Turkish exports and the reduc-
tion of the country’s dependence on imported 
energy sources are the two areas most likely 
to help cut the current account deficit. How-
ever, the high share of imported intermediates 
in export goods remains a major problem for 
Turkey. Before the financial crisis, the IMF esti-
mated this share at 70%, and any increases in 
exports directly correlated with increases in im-
ports (as well as with domestic consumption). 
In the aftermath of the economic downturn, 
the correlation became less pronounced due 
to an increase in the export of low-processed 
goods (food, building materials) to countries 
across the Middle East and North Africa.
The AKP government has been actively pur-
suing the policy of promoting Turkish goods 
abroad and modernising the export structure 
12 An ambitious plan to construct several coal-fired power 
plants collapsed after TAQA (UAE) announced that it was 
suspending the implementation of the project worth 
$12 billion. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/
taqa-turkey-idUKL6N0GR0WN20130826
The growth of Turkish exports and the 
reduction of the country’s dependence 
on imported energy sources are the two 
areas most likely to help cut the current 
account deficit.
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by increasing the share of high-technology 
goods in overall exports. Among the measures 
taken by Ankara has been the establishment of 
a network of trade advisors in importing coun-
tries (since the AKP came to power, the number 
of such advisors has nearly tripled to more than 
200 people). The government has also been 
providing support to exporters by producing 
reports on individual markets, as well as by of-
fering them assistance and funding (of up to 
$7,500) for business trips to establish new trade 
links. Every two years, the government draws 
up a list of the most promising export markets 
(in 2012, Poland was the only EU country in-
cluded in the list). As in the case of the energy 
market, the measures aimed at restructuring 
and stimulating Turkish exports are of a long-
term nature and are integrally linked to deep 
economic reforms. This means that they are 
unlikely to have a significant effect on Turkey’s 
current account deficit in the immediate future.
Hot money
An immediate threat to the Turkish economy is 
posed by the inflow of speculative capital and 
the risks associated with the banking sector, 
namely, the low level of savings in local banks 
(i.e. a high loans to deposits ratio) as well as 
the heavy reliance of Turkish banks on foreign 
financing. Turkey’s short-term debt accounts 
for about a third of its total debt and is gen-
erated mainly by banks, which are responsible 
for about 68% of this debt (June 2013). Mean-
while, the share of short-term liabilities in the 
total debt of the banking sector is 62% (June 
2013). Such a large share of current liabilities 
in the total debt of the banking sector has 
raised concerns about the banks’ ability to raise 
enough capital to pay off their debt13. The sit-
uation is further aggravated by the persistently 
high consumer lending figures, which increased 
13 At the end of June this year, Turkey’s foreign debt stood 
at $367 billion, of which short-term debt was $125 billion 
(35%); figures published by the Central Bank of Turkey.
by 29% y/y in August (Turkey’s Central Bank in-
tends to curb growth in costumer credit to just 
15% in 2013).
Turkey is also exposed to the risks associated 
with the potential flight of so-called hot mon-
ey. In 2012, the inflow of portfolio investment 
into Turkey doubled compared to 2011 and 
reached $38 billion. However in summer 2013, 
Turkey experienced an outflow of capital - in 
June and July the outflow of portfolio invest-
ment was estimated at over $4 billion. This was 
linked to both the protests staged to protect 
Gezi Park and to the changing attitude among 
investors towards emerging markets.
In view of the continuing risk of capital flight, it 
is crucial for Turkey to maintain a positive image 
among foreign investors. Currently, two of the 
three largest credit rating agencies (Moody’s 
and Fitch) have put Turkey at investment grade; 
however, S&P and IHS continue to offer a more 
cautious assessment of the Turkish economy 
due to the risks associated with the outflow of 
capital and with Turkey’s domestic situation.
A race against time
The reforms implemented by the AKP govern-
ment have focused on the creation of efficient 
institutions responsible for the regulation of the 
economy, but have failed to build a competitive 
and productive economic system, as evidenced 
by, among other things, the continued depen-
dence of Turkish exports on imported interme-
diate goods and the structural deficit in the 
country’s current account balance. To resolve 
these problems, Ankara needs to carry out 
further reforms (already included in the gov-
In view of the continuing risk of capital 
flight, it is crucial for Turkey to maintain 
a positive image among foreign investors.
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ernment’s development plan for 2014-2018)14. 
Their implementation, however, is contingent 
on maintaining the current trend in economic 
development and on ensuring a positive image 
of Turkey among foreign investors. This task 
may prove difficult because of the challenges 
the AKP is facing domestically15: an uncertain 
future for the peace talks with the Kurds, social 
tensions exposed during the Gezi Park protests, 
and the upcoming local and presidential elec-





remains precarious due to the ongoing conflict 
in Syria, the resultant influx of Syrian refugees 
into the country, the occasional cross-border 
shelling, and the suggestions that Turkey might 
become involved in the Syrian conflict. This is 
coupled with growing instability across the 
Middle East and the continuing crisis in the eu-
rozone. Finally, Turkey also remains vulnerable 
to external factors that may inhibit the inflow 
of foreign capital, such as a potential change in 
investor sentiment towards emerging markets.
